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WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES VERSUS JOINT VENTURES: 
THE DETERMINANT FACTORS IN THE 
CATALAN MULTINATIONAL MANUFACTURING CASE a,b 
 
Montserrat Álvarezc 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to investigate the factors influencing the choice between 
establishing a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) or entering into a joint venture (JV) as made by 
Catalan manufacturing firms investing abroad. The validity of certain key transaction-cost 
hypotheses in this case is tested using binomial logistic regression. Results indicate that a 
Catalan manufacturing firm is more likely to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary if the firm is 
sufficiently large, has had substantial experience in the host country geographical region, but is 
young and possesses little general experience in the international sphere. On the other hand, a 
Catalan firm is more likely to invest via a WOS if the firm possesses intangible or tacit assets 
and operates within a technologically advanced sector. Finally, a joint venture is preferred by a 
Catalan firm if the potential host country is perceived to imply a high degree of instability and 
risk or has a high rate of growth. 
 
Key words: wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS), joint venture (JV), multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), Catalonia. 
JEL Classification: F21, F23. 
 
 
RESUMEN: El objetivo de este documento es investigar los factores que influyen en la elección 
entre establecer una filial de plena propiedad o una joint venture, realizada por las empresas 
catalanas manufactureras que invierten en el exterior. Por medio de una regresión logística 
binomial comprobamos para este caso la validez de una serie de hipótesis provenientes de la 
teoría de los costes de transacción. Los resultados obtenidos indican que una empresa 
manufacturera catalana implantará más probablemente una filial de plena propiedad si la 
empresa es suficientemente grande, tiene una experiencia sustancial en la zona geográfica del 
país de destino, pero es joven y posee poca experiencia general en el ámbito internacional. Por 
otro lado, una empresa catalana tiene más probabilidad de implantar una filial propia también si 
la empresa posee activos intangibles o tácitos y opera en un sector avanzado tecnológicamente. 
Finalmente, preferirá una filial de propiedad compartida si el país de destino implica un alto 
grado de inestabilidad o riesgo o si tiene una elevada tasa de crecimiento. 
 
Palabras clave: filial de plena propiedad, filial de propiedad compartida o joint venture, 
empresa multinacional, Cataluña. 
Códigos JEL: F21, F23. 
 
                                                          
a Comments are welcome. The opinions expressed in the papers do not necessarily reflect the IEB’s 
opinions. 
 
b The author acknowledges the comments of an anonymous referee and the financial support of the 
project Grup Consolidat de Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya 2001 SGR 00030. A first draft of this 
paper was presented at the XXVIII Simposio de Análisis Económico held in Seville in 2003. 
 
c Corresponding address: 
Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Spanish Economy - University of Barcelona 
Av. Diagonal, 690, 08034 Barcelona 
Telephone: + 34 93 402 45 98 - Fax: + 34 93 402 18 21 
e-mail: montserratalvarez@ub.edu 
 
 2
1. Introduction  
 
In recent years there has been a significant growth in both foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows and in the number of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the world. Spain 
and Catalonia have mirrored this pattern, and in the last decade, have experienced a 
great increase not just in terms of investment flows in general, but particularly in terms 
of outward flows and specifically manufacturing flows. Nowadays, outward direct 
investment flows are greater than inward ones for the Catalan manufacturing sector. 
Simultaneously, there has been a substantial growth in the number of Catalan 
manufacturing enterprises establishing production subsidiaries abroad.  
 
This paper investigates Catalan investment overseas. The question of foreign investment 
paying attention on entry mode determinants, specifically, has been extensively studied 
in the international literature. However, little research has been carried out in relation to 
Spain1 and none at all in relation to Catalonia, which makes the contribution of this 
paper a novel one. The aim of our research is to investigate -in relation to well-founded 
hypotheses in the literature on the subject- the factors that influence the choice made by 
Catalan manufacturing firms between setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) as 
opposed to a joint venture (JV).  
 
The next section (Section 2) briefly reviews, therefore, the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature on entry mode determinants2. Section 3 describes the data used in 
this empirical study, the methodology applied and the proposed econometric model. 
Section 4 outlines the hypotheses that test our econometric model and explains the 
results obtained. Finally, Section 5 discusses our conclusions and the limitations of the 
study.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Molero (1998), Pla (1999) and Ramón (2001). The specific choice between WOS and 
JV has only been studied by López and García (1998,1999), albeit within a more general framework. 
 
2 A particular case of which is the choice between WOS and JV. 
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2. Theoretical and empirical literature review 
 
Research on factors that determine the choice between setting up a WOS or a JV in a 
foreign country corresponds within the more extensive theoretical and empirical 
literature on entry modes. The theoretical literature about entry-mode determinants has 
basically conformed to the notion of transaction costs theory (TCT) (Williamson, 1975, 
1985) applied to the international field. Our particular research draws on the work of 
Hennart (1991), Gatignon and Anderson (1986), Alonso (1994) and Hill et al (1990), 
whose research is grounded wholly or partially in TCT.  However, we have also drawn 
on resource-based theory, primarily on the work of Kogut and Zander (1993) and 
Madhok (1997,1998).  
 
The more integrated entry modes - such as WOS - mean greater control but also require 
a major commitment in terms of resources and imply both greater risk and less 
flexibility (Hill et al 1990). Summarising the conclusions obtained in the literature, a 
firm may prefer to invest through a WOS in the following conditions: 
 
1. It possesses very specific assets, or assets with great potential for generating profits. 
In this case, an investing firm may prefer to protect itself against possible 
opportunistic behaviour by a partner using firm’s assets to pursue its own interests. 
Moreover, the firm would prefer not to have to share the potentially high revenues 
that its assets may generate.  
2. It possesses tacit assets related to the firm internally and its organisation, which 
cannot be easily transmitted to an external partner. In this case, a WOS is preferable 
to a JV, irrespective of the possible transaction costs attached. 
 
On the other hand, a firm may prefer to invest through a JV in the following situations: 
 
1. The firm needs to share risks (for instance, important when a host country is 
economically and/or politically unstable). 
2. The firm needs additional resources to invest abroad. 
3. The firm needs to be supplied with complementary knowledge by a partner (for 
instance, when a firm does not have adequate trade experience or country-specific 
experience, or when the host country is perceived to be very different to the home 
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country). This kind of knowledge is very difficult to obtain in the marketplace due 
to the associated high transaction costs. 
 
Empirical studies have usually focused on firm-specific variables and country-specific 
variables in their approach to these theoretical notions. Listed in Table 1 – and used in 
our proposed econometric model - are the variables that have produced the best 
explanatory results.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1. Entry mode determinant factors   
 
Variables Value Authors 
Firm size (assets, sales, employees) Positive Kogut and Singh (1988b), Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990), Makino and Neupert (2000), Hennart and Larimo (1998), Mutinelli 
and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b), Lecraw (1984), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b), Erramilli et al (1997), Agarwal and 
Ramaswami (1992a), Pan and Tse (2000), Pla (1999), Ramón (2001), Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) 
International experience Positive Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Hennart (1991b), Hennart and Larimo (1998), Madhok (1998), Mutinelli and Piscitello 
(1998a, 1998b), Padmanabhan and Cho (1996, 1999), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b), Erramilli (1991), Agarwal and 
Ramaswami (1992a), Contractor and Kundu (1998), Pla (1999), Ramón (2001), López and García (1998, 1999), Meyer 
(2001), Brouthers and Brouthers (2001), Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) 
Technological advantages 
(generally, R&D 
expenditure/sales). Also 
subjective perceptions such as 
asset specificity, asset tacitness,  
or similar 
Positive Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Kogut and Singh (1988b), Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990), Hennart and Larimo (1998), 
Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b), Padmanabhan and Cho (1996, 1999), Fagre and Wells (1982), Madhok (1998), 
Lecraw (1984), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b), Erramilli et al (1997), Kim and Hwang (1992), Kogut and Zander (1993), 
Brouthers et al (1996), Molero (1998), Pla (1999), López and García (1998, 1999) 
Marketing and product differentiation 
advantages (generally, advertising 
expenditure/sales). Also perceived 
importance of product quality or 
brand 
Positive Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990), Fagre and Wells (1982), Lecraw (1984), Erramilli et al 
(1997), Pan (1996), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992a), Brouthers et al (1996), Pan and Tse (2000), Contractor and Kundu 
(1998), Ramón (2001) 
Socio-cultural distance Negative Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Madhok (1998), Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990),  Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b), 
Padmanabhan and Cho (1996, 1999), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b), Pan (1996), Erramilli (1991), Kim and Hwang 
(1992), Brouthers et al (1996), Tse et al (1997), Pan and Tse (2000), Pla (1999), Ramón (2001), López and García (1998, 
1999), Brouthers and Brouthers (2001), Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) 
Economic or political risk  
(volatility of operating 
environment) 
Negative Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b), Madhok (1998), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b), 
Pan (1996), Contractor (1990), Kim and Hwang (1992), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992a), Pan and Tse (2000), Contractor 
and Kundu (1998), Ramón (2001) 
Country size or growth. 
(generally, an attractive market).  
Positive Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990), Hennart (1991b), Makino and Neupert (2000), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b), Contractor 
(1990), Lecraw (1984), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992a), Brouthers et al (1996), Contractor and Kundu (1998), Ramón 
(2001) 
Source: Author. 
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3. Data and methodology 
 
In accordance with the theoretical and empirical literature of the previous section, data 
needed to be assembled on Catalan investing firms and foreign host countries for our 
analysis of the factors determining the choice between a WOS and a JV. In order to 
collect data on Catalan manufacturing MNEs, a survey was conducted in the early part 
of 2002 in the form of a brief questionnaire mailed out to firms owning at least one 
overseas production subsidiary in 2001. The companies were selected from data 
provided by the Catalan Government (Fontrodona and Hernández, 2001). Host country 
data were obtained from secondary sources such as the World Bank, UNESCO, 
Hofstede (1980, 2001), and the investment magazine Institutional Investor. 
 
The response rate for the survey was 71.34%, representing 228 production subsidiaries. 
The distribution of these 228 subsidiaries by geographical location and industry, 
respectively, is summarised in Tables 2 and 3. Catalan manufacturing MNEs owning at 
least 95%, and less than 95% of the subsidiary’s equity capital, respectively, are 
classified in the tables as WOS and JV. The ratio WOS:JV is 43:573.  
 
 
 
Table 2. 228 Catalan manufacturing subsidiaries: distribution by geographical region 
 
Geographical area WOS JV 
Africa 14% 86% 
Latin America  48% 52% 
Asia   23% 77% 
NAFTA Area 38% 62% 
Rest of Europe 35% 65% 
European Union 62% 38% 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 JVs are more numerous in our database than in that of Fontrodona and Hernández (2001), where JVs 
represented 52% of the sample.   
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Table 3. 228 Catalan manufacturing subsidiaries: distribution by industry  
 
Industry WOS JV 
Food and beverages 43.8% 56.3% 
Wood and cork 33.3% 66.7% 
Machinery 42.9% 57.1% 
Transport 53.3% 46.7% 
Electrical material 18.2% 81.8% 
Electronic material, precision 
instruments and office machinery 90.9% 9.1% 
Minerals and non-ferrous metals 72.2% 27.8% 
Printing 50.0% 50.0% 
Plastics and rubber 25.0% 75.0% 
Paper articles  50.0% 50.0% 
Metal products 40.0% 60.0% 
Chemical products 40.0% 60.0% 
Textile products, leather and footwear 18.2% 81.8% 
Source: Author 
 
 
From the survey we obtained firm-specific variables – see Table 4 - to be subsequently 
used as explanatory variables in our econometric model. Insufficient information was 
available from Catalan manufacturing multinational enterprises in relation to research 
and development expenditure and advertising expenditure (both as a percentage of 
sales), each of which is frequently used as a proxy variable for, respectively, a firm’s 
technological advantage and marketing/product differentiation advantage. Thus, 
following the empirical literature - e.g., Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Mutinelli 
and Piscitello (1998a) - we used the corresponding industrial sector data as proxies for 
these variables4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 The data used was taken from the Encuesta sobre innovación tecnológica en las empresas produced by 
the Spanish statistics office and Estadística, producció i comptes de la indústria, produced by the Catalan 
statistics office.  
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Table 4. Firm-specific variables used as explanatory variables in our econometric 
model  
 
Variable (ACRONYM) Description 
  
Size (SIZE) Number of employees  
Experience (EXP) Number of years in existence 
Subsidiaries (SUBS) Number of foreign subsidiaries  
Number of zones (ZONES) Number of geographical zones (EU, Latin America, 
NAFTA, Asia, Africa, rest of Europe), where a firm has 
international experience (subsidiaries) 
Presence in an the area (PRES) The value of 1 is given to a firm if it has a significant trade 
presence in the host country’s geographical region. (By 
‘significant’ is meant that more than 20% of a firm’s exports 
go to this region and that it has sales/distribution subsidiaries 
there)  
Subsidiary age (SUBAGE) Number of years in existence of the subsidiary 
R+D (R+D) Research and development expenditure as a proportion of 
total sales. (The figure used represents the Catalan industry 
sector in which the firm operates)  
Advertising (ADV)  Advertising expenditure as a proportion of total sales. (The 
figure used represents the Catalan industry sector in which 
the firm operates)  
Asset specificity (SPEC) Degree of asset specificity, as perceived by management 
Asset tacitness (TACIT) Degree of asset tacitness, as perceived by management 
Source: Author 
 
Likewise, in line with both Kogut and Zander (1993) and Kim and Hwang (1992), we 
included variables that represented subjective management perceptions of a firm’s 
assets and knowledge. More specifically, we wished to investigate the degree of 
specificity and tacitness of a firm’s assets, in the opinion of management, and, 
consequently, the extent to which these assets were considered too sensitive or too 
complex to share with a partner5. The appendix describes the questions asked as the 
basis for developing an asset specificity (questions 1-6) and asset tacitness (questions 7-
10) index6.  
 
Finally, Table 5 lists the variables considered in relation to the countries where the 228 
Catalan subsidiaries are located. As mentioned above, the data was sourced from a 
range of secondary sources (mainly the World Bank) and choice was restricted by 
criteria of homogeneous availability. 
                                                          
5The choice between setting up a WOS or a JV is highly strategic, and for this reason we believe that 
management perceptions in relation to a firm’s assets may play a prominent role in the decision. 
 
6The average of the responses to questions 1-6 and 7-10, respectively, of a firm’s managers was used for 
our econometric calculations in order to construct an asset-specificity and asset-tacitness index. 
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Table 5. Country-specific variables used as explanatory variables in our econometric 
model  
 
Variable (ACRONYM) Description 
  
Gross domestic product (GDP) Host country GDP at constant prices (average for the last 7-10 
years). 
GDP growth rate (GROWTH) Host country annual GDP growth rate (average for the last 7-
10 years). 
Socio-cultural distance (SCD) Socio-cultural distance between Spain (Catalonia) and the host 
country, based on Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) four cultural 
dimensions. Used was Kogut and Singh (1988) formula for 
obtaining a socio-cultural distance index: 
( ){ }∑ −=
=
4
1i
i
2
ihijj 4/V/IICD ,  where Iij is country j’s rating 
along cultural dimension i, Iih is the rating for Spain (country 
of reference, h) and Vi is the variance for cultural dimension i 
Risk (RISK) Host country risk level (average for the last 7 years), obtained 
from the Institutional Investor index (based on a periodic 
survey mailed to more than 100 international banks). This 
index awards a higher value to less risky countries. 
Students in third-level 
education (3L-ED) 
Number of students in third-level education as a proportion of 
the host country population (average for the last 7-10 years).  
Number of scientists and 
engineers (SCI-ENG)  
Number of scientists and engineers per 1000 inhabitants 
(average for last 7-10 years).  
Source: Author 
 
 
The variables listed in Tables 4 and 5 were included in the econometric model we 
propose here to explain the factors that determine a Catalan manufacturing MNE’s 
choice between setting up a WOS or a JV. The ultimate aim is to test well-established  
hypotheses from the theoretical and empirical fields in relation to factors determining 
entry mode. 
 
The proposed econometric model, in line with the empirical literature, is a binomial 
logistic regression model. The endogenous variable takes one of two values: 1 to 
represent WOS and 0 to represent JV. The independent variables explain, then, the 
probability of a subsidiary being a WOS rather than a JV. The total number of 
observations in this case was 228 and stepwise regression was used for the analysis7. 
 
                                                          
7 Authors studying foreign direct investment (FDI) have also used this or similar methods; e.g., Gutiérrez 
and Heras (2000), Anderson and Coughlan (1987), Contractor (1990), Dunning  (1977), Root and Ahmed 
(1979), Maté (1996b), Molero (1998), Liu et al (1997). We began with a model that included all the 
independent variables, but dropped the least significant variable after each step, thus terminating with a 
model in which all the variables were significant at 10%. This procedure is widely used, despite the fact 
that it may be affected by problems associated with data mining.  
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Our model is formulated as follows: 
 
Y*r =α+βXr+ur            Prob(Yr=1)= F(α+βXr),  
 
where F is the logistic distribution function, Yr=1 indicates that subsidiary r is a WOS, 
and Yr* is a latent variable which is not observable, and would indicate, for instance, 
the net benefits of setting up a WOS compared to a JV which, if positive, will lead to 
the creation of a WOS, and if negative, to the creation of a JV. These net benefits 
depend on a set of explanatory variables in the vector Xr, where Xr = (SIZEir, EXPir, 
SUBSir, SUBAGEr SPECir, TACITir, ZONESir, PRESjir R+Dir, ADVir, GDPjr, 
GROWTHjr, RISKjr, SCjr, 3L-EDjr, SCI-ENGjr), as defined in Tables 4 and 5 above, 
and where r is the subsidiary, i is r’s parent company and j is the country where r is set 
up. 
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4. Hypotheses and results 
 
Using the data and methodology described in the previous section, and in accordance 
with the theoretical and empirical literature, the following hypotheses (H1-H8) will be 
tested: 
 
H1: The larger a firm, the more likely it is to set up a WOS (instead of a JV) in a 
foreign country. In questions of size, larger firms (i.e, firms with more employees) 
have more resources, information and financial leverage, and therefore do not need a 
partner in order to invest abroad.  
  
H2: The more experienced a firm, the more likely it is to set up a WOS (instead of 
a JV) in a foreign country. This hypothesis takes account of experience in general 
(years in existence) as well as international experience and its extent (i.e. number of 
foreign subsidiaries and the number of geographical regions where these subsidiaries 
are present). Firms that are more experienced in management and organisational terms, 
as well as in the international field, will not require the support that can be provided by 
a partner. On the other hand, if a firm has had extensive experience in a particular 
geographical region (measured via the variable ‘presence in the area’), i.e. if it has 
acquired substantial knowledge of the markets in a region, then it is more likely to set 
up independently via a WOS rather than via a JV. This experience represents knowledge 
that would be almost impossible to acquire in the open market due to its tacitness and 
the associated transaction costs.  
 
H3: The more specific and tacit management perceives a firm’s assets to be, the 
more likely the firm is to set up a WOS (instead of a JV) in a foreign country.  If a 
firm possesses specific assets, a partner that acts opportunistically can cause substantial 
damage to the firm.  Moreover, asset tacitness may make it difficult to share assets with 
a partner in a productive way;  know-how, for example, is particularly difficult to share, 
due to this implicit tacitness.  
 
H4: The more intensive an industry in terms of technology and advertising, the 
more likely a firm operating in that sector is to set up a WOS (instead of a JV) in a 
foreign country. Industrial technological intensity (R&D expenditure/sales) and 
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industrial advertising intensity (advertising expenditure/sales) represent, respectively, a 
firm’s technological and marketing/product differentiation advantages. A firm with 
advantages of this kind may be apprehensive about a JV with a partner who may behave 
opportunistically and erode these advantages. Moreover, investment in a WOS means 
that a firm does not have to share the potentially high profits that these advantages may 
bring. 
 
H5: The more unstable and riskier the host country, the less likely a firm is to set 
up a WOS (instead of a JV) there. A country that is economically and politically 
unstable has a high level of risk associated with it. This would indicate the need for a 
partner to share these risks.  A JV is a more flexible option that makes it easier to 
withdraw from a market in the event of a deterioration in operating conditions. 
 
H6: The more socio-culturally distant a country, the less likely a firm is to set up a 
WOS (instead of a JV) in that country. An operating environment that is substantially 
different from the usual environment of the investing firm (in terms of customs, 
institutions and traditions) would indicate the need for a partner to share the burden of  
managing a subsidiary and foreign workforce. 
 
H7: The more attractive a host country market (in terms of GDP or GDP growth), 
the more likely a firm is to set up a WOS (instead of a JV) in that country.  In these 
circumstances, a WOS is the more attractive option because it means that the potentially 
high revenues to be obtained in this market do not have to be shared. Nonetheless, 
Hennart (1991) points out that a JV is often the fastest route to entering an attractive 
market.   
  
H8: The more human capital (third level students) and technological capital 
(scientists and engineers) in a country, the less likely a firm is to set up a WOS 
(instead of a JV) in that country. If a firm is interested in improving its knowledge 
base or learning new operating methods, then entering into a JV with local partners is a 
suitable approach to investing in a country with substantial quantities of these strategic 
assets. 
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Three variants of the econometric model are proposed, as follows: Model 1 includes, in 
the first step of the stepwise regression, all the variables described in Tables 4 and 5; 
Model 2 includes all the variables with the exception of asset specificity and tacitness; 
and finally, Model 3 includes all the variables except R+D and advertising. The main 
difference between Models 2 and 3 is that the latter only considers subjective 
measurements from the point of view of the management about the firm’s assets, 
whereas the former only includes objective measurements in relation to the industry’s 
assets as a whole. 
 
Table 6. 228 Catalan manufacturing subsidiaries: WOS vs JV determinants 8  
 
 
 
Binomial logistic 
regression Model 1 
Binomial logistic 
regression Model 2 
Binomial logistic 
regression Model 3 
Size (hundreds of employees) 0.0218** 
(3.61) 
0.0218** 
(3.60) 
0.0231** 
(3.82) 
Experience -0.0150* 
(-2.42) 
-0.0139* 
(-2.27) 
-0.0148* 
(-2.46) 
Subsidiaries -0.0760* 
(-2.53) 
-0.0761* 
(-2.54) 
-0.0740** 
(-2.48) 
Presence in the area  1.218* 
(2.34) 
1.154* 
(2.24) 
1.434** 
(2.78) 
Tacitness 0.332* 
(2.05) 
-- 0.383* 
(2.39) 
R+D 0.467* 
(2.20) 
0.507* 
(2.43) 
-- 
 
Risk  0.0195** 
(2.65) 
0.0162* 
(2.29) 
0.0187** 
(2.58) 
GDP growth rate -0.106+ 
(-1.77) 
-0.112+ 
(-1.86) 
-0.103+ 
(-1.73) 
Goodness-of-fit R2 Nagelkerke: 
0.243 
R2McFadden: 0.148 
χ2: 44.89** 
Percentage of correct 
predictions:  
0: 80.2 
1: 59.4 
Total: 71.2 
R2 Nagelkerke: 
0.222 
R2McFadden: 0.132 
χ2: 39.99** 
Percentage of correct 
predictions: 0: 78.5 
1: 52.1 
Total: 67.11 
R2 Nagelkerke: 
0.219 
R2McFadden: 0.131 
χ2: 39.94** 
Percentage of correct 
predictions: 0: 79.3 
1: 56.25 
Total: 69.4 
Observations 228 228 228 
Notes: (i) z-statistics in brackets. (ii) **Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 5% level. 
+Significant at the 10% level.  
 
As far as results are concerned, Hypothesis 1 is fulfilled, in that size positively 
correlates with the probability of setting up a WOS instead of a JV. This conclusion is 
also supported by Spanish entry mode studies by Pla (1999) and Ramón (2001). In 
relation to entry mode determinants - including WOS vs JV -  at the international level, 
                                                          
8 Explanatory variables significant to p<0.10. All three models include a constant term. Models run under 
Limdep and SPSS.  
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similar results have also been obtained by Kogut and Singh (1988b), Gomes-Casseres 
(1989, 1990), Makino and Neupert (2000), Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b), 
Lecraw (1984), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b), Erramilli et al (1997), Agarwal and 
Ramaswami (1992a), Pan and Tse (2000), and Brouthers and Brouthers (2001). 
 
Hypothesis 2 is also confirmed if we take into account the dummy variable in relation to 
substantial experience in a host country’s geographical area as implying a greater 
knowledge of the country’s market and environment. This conclusion was also reached 
in empirical studies at the international level by Stopford and Wells (1972), Hennart 
(1991), Hennart and Larimo (1998), Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b), and 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2001)9.  
 
Geographical dispersion of a firm’s foreign subsidiaries is not a significant variable, 
whilst the number of foreign subsidiaries and firm’s general experience (years in 
existence) are both negatively related to the probability of setting up a WOS instead of a 
JV (a result that contradicts Hypothesis 2). In the case of Catalan MNEs, it seems that 
relatively younger and less internationally experienced firms have a preference for 
investing abroad independently. This somewhat surprising result has also been obtained 
by Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), Erramilli (1991) and Ramón (2001). A possible 
explanation is a greater degree of ethnocentricity; in other words, in spite of their 
inexperience, Catalan firms prefer more integrated entry modes in order to preserve 
their modus operandi. Another possible explanation is that inexperienced firms find it 
more difficult to assess a partner’s behaviour and therefore choose more integrated entry 
modes so as to avoid possible problems. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are only partially satisfied. They hold for perceived asset tacitness 
and industrial R+D expenditure, but not for perceived asset specificity and advertising 
expenditure, even though the coefficient for asset specificity is significant and positive 
at p<0.15. Similar findings in relation to technological intensity were obtained, for 
instance, by Stopford and Wells (1972), Kogut and Singh (1988b), Gomes-Casseres 
(1989, 1990), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Padmanabhan and Cho (1996, 1999), 
                                                          
9 Many of these authors considered country rather than regional experience. But, following Mutinelli and 
Piscitello (1998), it seems reasonable to assume that if a firm has entered neighbouring countries, it will 
have obtained social, political and business knowledge that will be of use in the target country. 
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Fagre and Wells (1982), Erramilli et al (1997), Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), Molero 
(1998), and Pla (1999). Moreover, our findings in relation to subjective management 
perceptions are confirmed by Kim and Hwang (1992) (tacitness), Kogut and Zander 
(1993) (complexity, teachability, codificability), Contractor and Kundu (1998) and 
Ramón (2001) (importance of product quality and brand), and Pla (1999) (tacitness and 
specificity).  
 
Hypothesis 5, referring to level of risk, is fully satisfied. Similar findings were 
described in Ramón (2001), Durán (1987), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Mutinelli 
and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b), Madhok (1998), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992b), Pan 
(1996), Contractor (1990), Kim and Hwang (1992), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992a), 
Pan and Tse (2000), and Contractor and Kundu (1998). 
 
Socio-cultural distance (Hypothesis 6) is neither positively or negatively significant in 
relation to the endogenous variable. A possible explanation is that Catalan firms are 
only interested in the fact of having acquired knowledge of a specific market as a 
consequence of its experience in that country or neighbouring countries. In other words, 
degree of socio-cultural difference is not significant because the investing firm feels 
confident, on the strength of previous experience acquired in the region, of being able to 
deal with local workers, suppliers, customers and government authorities. Empirical 
studies in the field have reported mixed results for the relationship between socio-
cultural distance and the probability of establishing a WOS: thus, negative results were 
obtained by Pla (1999), López and García (1998, 1999),  Gatignon and Anderson 
(1988), Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998a, 1998b), Erramilli (1991), Agarwal and 
Ramaswami (1992a, 1992b), Brouthers and Brouthers (2001), Barbosa and Louri (2002) 
and Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), whereas positive results were described by Ramón 
(2001), Pan (1996), Padmanabhan and Cho (1996, 1999) and Madhok (1998). It may be 
that for Catalan MNEs the positive and negative relationships cancel each other out and 
thereby produce a final result that is not significant (as found in Contractor and Kundu, 
1998 and Larimo, 1992)10. 
 
                                                          
10 This positive relationship can be explained by the fact that, in culturally distant countries, it is more 
difficult for a partner to adapt to an investing firm’s production processes and organisation. Moreover, it 
is more difficult to assess whether or not a partner is acting opportunistically. 
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In relation to Hypothesis 7, GDP is not significant and GDP growth rate is negatively 
significant. A firm investing in a more dynamic host country is more likely to do so via 
a JV, as the fastest method of entry that enables a unique opportunity to be immediately 
exploited11. Hennart (1991) and Gomes-Casseres (1989, 1990) obtained similar results, 
but opposite results were described in Barbosa and Louri (2002) and Makino and 
Neupert (2000)12. 
 
Finally, the role of strategic assets (Hypothesis 8) is not significant. Catalan 
manufacturing MNEs do not take into account the possibility of updating their 
knowledge base by entering into joint ventures with local partners in countries with 
substantial stores of human and technological capital. In other words, Catalan firms are 
more concerned about protecting rather than updating their own knowledge. 
 
Subsidiary age is not a significant variable. This is hardly surprising as the average age 
of Catalan subsidiaries is only seven years, so it could be considered that looking 
currently at the problem WOS vs. JV or in the beginning (when the concrete subsidiary 
was set up) is nearly the same in this case13. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this article, we studied the factors influencing the choice between setting up a WOS 
or a JV in a host country by Catalan manufacturing MNEs. Our findings would point to 
a Catalan firm choosing to establish a WOS rather than a JV if the firm is large, if it 
possesses tacit assets and knowledge (as perceived by management), if it is involved in 
technologically intensive industries, and if it has a considerable experience in the 
geographical region in which the host country is located (even if lacking in substantial 
                                                          
11 Although this explanation refers to the WOS vs. JV decision prior to entry to a market and not after the 
event (as in our study), the average age of Catalan subsidiaries is only seven years. As the GDP growth 
rate was measured as the average for the last seven years, too, we can therefore consider that this 
explanation is still valid. 
 
12 Many authors use the rate of growth for individual industries rather than for the economy as a whole, 
for reasons of  homogenous data availability criteria. 
 
13 In relation to obstacles encountered in the investment process - specifically if host countries had 
prohibited them from setting up a WOS – no Catalan firm reported any problems. We therefore assumed 
that no prohibition existed. The Institutional Investors Index, nonetheless, could be considered to account 
for this variable.   
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international experience). On the other hand, a Catalan firm is more likely to enter into a 
JV in order to operate in economically/politically uncertain countries and in countries 
with a high rate of growth.  
 
It is appropriate at this stage to point out some of the limitations of this study. For 
instance, the choice of explanatory variables might be considered arbitrary, in the sense 
that there are many other possible variables underlying the different approaches to TCT, 
the theoretical basis for this paper. This criticism, however, applies to all empirical 
studies based on TCT, which, as well as Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 
1993), could be considered more a taxonomy of possible variables to be included in 
empirical analyses, than a theory per se. In other words, the absence of clear structural 
models in this theoretical field is one of the main reasons for this arbitrariness. 
Nevertheless, in our study we included variables 1) for which it was possible to obtain 
homogeneous data for our firm and country database, 2) that were extensively used in 
empirical studies of entry mode determinants, and 3) that permits well-established 
theoretical hypotheses in relation to entry mode determinant factors to be tested. Future 
lines of investigation, however, could involve the inclusion of another set of variables in 
our model, as well as the investigation of interaction between some of the variables 
considered in this paper. 
 
Finally, given the difficulty of obtaining individual data for Spanish and Catalan 
multinational firms, we were obliged to carry out our own survey, which in itself has the 
drawback that our conclusions are not entirely comparable to similar studies, and cannot 
be considered representative of the whole population. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1.  Subjective perceptions of a firms’ assets, assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale. 
        1=Total agreement;  7= Total disagreement 
 
1. Our production technology is totally specific to our firm. 
2. Our system of organisation is totally specific to our firm.  
3. Our product is totally adapted and specific to our customers.  
4. Preservation of our product quality is essential to our success.  
5. Preservation of our brand reputation is essential to our success. 
6. It would be difficult and harmful to transmit our human and physical capital to other 
businesses. 
7. Our technology is highly complex and difficult to both explain and comprehend. 
8. Our system of organisation is highly complex and difficult to both explain and 
comprehend. An extensive period training is necessary for our employees to learn 
our modus operandi. 
9. It is impossible to understand our firm’s modus operandi without spending some 
time in the company. 
 
 
 
 
 2. Correlation matrix 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SUBAGE EXP SIZE SUBS SPEC TACIT ZONES PRES R+D ADV GROWTH GDP RISK 3L-ED SC SCI-ENG
SUBAGE 1,000                
EXP ,152 1,000               
SIZE -,066 ,277 1,000              
SUBS ,004 ,119 ,611 1,000             
SPEC ,026 ,213 ,173 ,175 1,000            
TACIT ,043 ,088 ,031 -,010 ,495 1,000           
ZONES -,083 ,018 ,233 ,481 ,184 ,127 1,000          
PRES ,023 ,125 ,082 ,253 -,010 -,055 ,192 1,000         
R+D -,112 ,052 ,187 ,152 ,018 ,108 ,254 ,207 1,000        
ADV ,146 ,125 -,101 -,050 -,176 -,325 -,014 ,135 ,127 1,000       
GROWTH -,023 ,077 -,037 -,103 -,001 -,031 -,061 ,082 ,036 ,068 1,000      
GDP ,087 -,006 -,101 ,036 -,007 -,155 ,029 -,050 -,018 ,231 -,081 1,000     
RISK ,030 ,045 ,099 ,183 -,029 -,188 ,027 ,139 ,001 ,094 -,065 ,560 1,000    
3L-ED ,123 -,042 -,008 ,160 -,022 -,177 ,021 ,061 -,103 ,161 -,361 ,646 ,621 1,000   
SC -,059 ,033 -,075 -,003 ,016 ,053 ,084 -,047 -,010 ,095 ,426 ,287 ,193 -,048 1,000  
SCI-ENG ,056 -,050 -,016 ,161 -,025 -,096 ,098 -,030 -,008 ,153 -,481 ,672 ,655 ,769 ,159 1,000 
1
9
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